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Economic Growth in India, 19555/6-1960/61
A. Introduction
The Planning Commission of the Government of India is now fomlat-
ing the development program for 1956/57-196o/61, the Second Five-Myse
Plan period. The draft Plan will not be issued until late 1955, but
there are already many statements which reflect preliminary official
views on the size and structure of that program. In addition, there
are now available the programs suggested by three responsible Indian organ-
izations. The "plan-frame" of Professor hahalanobis was prepared at
the request of the Government; it is based upon the work of the Indian
Statistical Institute (ISI) which is largely financed by the Government.
Though not "official", the ISI program can be expected to have direct
influence upon the work of the Planning Commission. The other two draft
plans are the research products of the Federation of 'ndian Chambers of
Commerce (FICC) and the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (IIPO). Both
these organizations are closely connected with Indian business, particular-
ly its organized and large-scale wing. The views of these business groups
are bound to have important bearinf-s both on the formulation and the
implementation of India's development program.
The present paper was initiated as an attempt to compare and perhaps
appraise these various proposals and suggestions. It turned out to be more
nearly an additional proposal; the systematic comparisons of the Indian
drafts have been relegated to an appendix. This shift can be explained
essentially on two counts. First was the writer's belief that overall
output targets in the various Indian plans were not matched by the pro-
vision of a scale and pattern of inputs - labor, capital, management
I
rand leadership -- adequate to their achievement. Given the desirability
of targets at the levels suggested, it seemed worthwhile to attempt to
assess appropr!.ate magnitudes for the input factors. In particular, there
was the convition that the additional employment provided in the Indian
proposals needed to be stepped up: the economic argument for this is
buttressed by the social and political gains that might be obtained through
a significa-nt reduction in the present level of unemployment.
Secoidly, the next five year period must do more than achieve a set
of output targets, however high their levels. By the end of these five
years, tiere must be established in the economy certain structural char-
acteristics which give promise of assuring subsequent growth. Iria has
long hrd a "static economy in progress". Whatever the reasons for this,
the economic relationships conducive to growth are at best only partially
preseat some must be strengthened, and others must be newly established.
In pirticular, the static and declining sectors of rural India must become
betcer integrated with the dynamic industrial and urban parts of India.
Su0h a relationship is a pre-condition for a greater emphasis upon indust-
r alization.
Some of the next plan proposals refer to this need. In the present
ormulation it is given much greater emphasis. To the ambitious indust-
rial, transportation and power program, there is added a special and
large-scale effort on rural development. This aspect of the program is
considered to be a very important one - without which neither the total
income expansion for 1960/61 nor the future growth potential of the
country can be assured.
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In the present formulation, the point of departure is generally
some consensus dramn from existing unofficial plans and preliminary state.-
ments on the official draft. Particular attention is given to the unemploy-
ment problem. The suggested levels and patterns of the output targets are
discussed both in terms of the employment prospects they offer and their
requirements for capital. Alternative estimates are given in rough figures
and for broad sectors of the econmy taken together. It is believed that
this macro treatment is adequate for assessing the nature of the program.
At a later time, the proposal can be spelled out -- and modified - on the
basis of material for individual crops, industries, services and the li.
1*
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B, Employment Goals for the Second Five Year Plan
Basic data on "means of liveihood", as of March, 1951, were published
in the Ceus of India, 1951. Major groupings are shown in Table I. To
make these comparable to estimates of income, the figures need to be adjusted
Table I - Population and Working
(millions)
Groups, 1951
Total Workers Nonsearning
Population Total Self-supporting Earning depend. dependnts
Urban 61 2 180 2.8
3. 16.6 1.5 35.2
t. 2.1 1.3 25.2
Rural 294o7 120 87 }1
Mo 70.6 11.9 674
t. 15.1 23.2 106.5
Total 356.6 1J2.3 104.4 37.9 214.3
upward by a small anount, from a total population basis of 356.6 million to
1361.2 million persons. Corresponding working force figures are given by
the National Income Committee. From these statistics rough projections
were made to approximate the working force in later years.
1. The Census tabulations exclude 4.41 million persons in Jainu and
Kashmir. Oitted too were 229,000 persons in the Punjab, where records
were lost in a fire at the Census Tabulation offices in Jullunder, The
final total (361,239,000) still excludes the Part B tribal areas of Assa
for which information was not obtained. (These areas contained approxima ly
600,000 people in 1951).
Table II. Working Force (millions as of March)
Total Lorking Non-earning
Population Force Dependents
Urban 62.5 21.7 40o.8
Rural 298.7 121.5 177.2
A: 1951 Total 361 .2(a) 143.2 218.0
Urban 71.3 24.8 46.5
Rural 309.9 126. 183.5
B: 1955 Total 381.2(b) 151.2 230.0
Urban 86.3 29.9 56.4
Rural 324.9 133.3 191.6
C: 1961 otal 41 1.2(b) 163.2 248.0
(a) Totals are given by the National Income Committee.
breakdowns are based on pertinent ratios of Table I.
Rural-urban
(b) Population assumed to increase by 5 million persons annually, the
absolute increase shown in official estimates for the years through 1954,
and suggested by the Indian Census Comissioner for the years through
1961. Working, force has been expanded by 2 million annually, the figure
estimated for the years 1948/49-1950/51. Urbanization has been assumed to
increase from 17.3 per cent in 1951 to 18.7 per cent in 1955 and 21 per cent
in 1961. Finaly, the ratio of urban working force to urban population
in 1951 was maintained for later years.
6The assumptions of Table II yield a working force of 163.2 mllion
in 1961, 12 million more then at present, i.e. there will be 10 million
more people in the working categories over the Second Five Tear Plan
period. It may also be assumed that urban populations will continue to
have a higher ratio of non-earners, and that urban workers will contime
to include a smaller percentage of earning dependents (persons only
partially self-supporting) than do rural people.
The current unemployment situation, on .which there are admittedly few
firm estimates, was summarized by the Finance Minister in December, 1954,
as involving "some 15 million people out of the total working force of
about 15 crores (vide Table In) who may be regarded as available for
absorption in new lines." The bases for this estimate are preliminary
indications from surveys in process that "in some of our urban areas 8 to
10 per cent of the employable population needs to be drawn into productive
employment." Using the estimates of Table IIB, this would suggest some
2.5 milion urban unemployed. There would thus be 12.5 million more in
the rural areas, about 10 per cent of the rural labor force. If an
utnemployed person is taken to mean one who actually is aware of his lack
of work, or of his small contribution to output on his job, and mho Is
prepared to accept alternative employmenty this would appear to be a high
1. "Official" estimates for the Second Plan occasionally assume an
increase of 9 million workers through natural growth over this period.
(See, for example, Mr. Deshmukh's statement in the Lok Sabha on Dec. 20, 1954,
and Mr. Nehru's to the National Development Council on May 5, 1955). These
projections seem conservative, given recent experience, the growing absolute
size of the total population, and the possibility that population may increase
more rapidly as a result of declining death rates (with birth rates lagging
behind).
estimate of actual ueMloy in rural India. (However, it is important
to remember that 18 per cent of rural workers are non-agricultural; here
the unemployment ratio may be well above 10 per cont.) an the other hand,
the 10 per cent figure is probably a low estimate of underemployment,
defined as the number of persons that could be withdrawn from the rural
labor force without reducing current levels of rural output, production
techniques remaining unchanged. Since it is important to reduce under-
employment in India, it may be appropriate to use the 10 per cent figure
(15 million persons) as the number of people in the present working force
for whom new job opportunities must be considered.
The Finance Minister has approached the problem in terms of abewbing
these 15 million over a ten year period, beginning with the Second live
Year Plan. Over the 11 years, beginning with 1955/56 (the last year of the
present Plan) and extending through karch 1966, this means the creation of
employment opportunities for some 22 million persons who will be added to
the labor force by natural growth, plus the 15 million wuo are currently
unemployed. An average of about 3.5 million new jobs is required each
1
year, beginning now0 Vhile some allowance might be made for a gradual
expansion in the capacity of the economy to absorb the unemployed, it would
appear realistic to plan now for such a rate of providing new employment
opportunities.
1. This figure differs markedly from Mlr. Deshmukh's target of 2.4 mMion
new Jobs each year. Partly this is due to his lower estimate of natural
increase in the labor force, Primarily, however, it is due to the fact
that he provides fo.r the absorption of only 3 millin of the presently
unemployed tding the Second Plano (Urban unemployed essentially?) This
leaves 12 million of the present unemployed for the Third Plan period
(1961-66), an average absorption of almost 5 million persons annually in
those years.
0 4
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Over the 6 year period from now until the end of the Second Plan,
therefore, what are the alternative possibilities for employing 21 mil14on
additional persons? At the most general level, it might be observed that
there are now some 25 million workers in urban areas (of whom about 2.5
million are unemployed). If essentially urban employment were being
considered, this would mean increasing the employment opportunities there
by more than 90 per cent. It would also mean the addition of almost 19
million more workers to urban areas, as against the 5 milion assumed in
Table IIC, and which already reflected a continuation in the acceleration
currently discernible in the rate of rural-urban migration. However,
instead of the urban areas attaining 21 per cent of total population, I
1961, they would need to increase to 31 per cent (assuming families moved
with workvers). This might of course occur through a more concentrated
growth in towns and smaller cities, although the present trend is for the
larger cities to grow more rapidly. In any case, the assumption of geeoviding
urban employment would mean almost a doubling of the urban-concentration
ratio in India over the decade 1951 to 1961. There would undoubtedly be
tremendous employment opportunities in housing and in such social overhead
fields as the supply of transportation, water, sanitation facilities, etc.
In 1951, for example, there were 10.31 i4llion houses in urban India. On
the average, these accomodated 6 persons, i.e. more than an average family
unit. (A governmental committee had estimated an urban shortage of 1.84
million houses in the pre-Plan period-a figure which corresponds reasonably
with the doubling-up ratio.) Programs for slum clearance were given considerable
attention in the First Five.Year 'lan. With at least a doubling of urban
9
population, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there would be
need for at least 10 million more urban housing units in 1961, as
compared with 1951. On the basis of the information available here, it
seems unlikely that as many asl zillion of these had been constructed,
both by private groups as well as public authorities, by April 1, 1955.
Conservytive cost estimates for the housing which the Central Gversnnt
believed would meet minimum standards were Ro. 2200 per tenement in
smaller townso, and Rs. 4500 in the multi-storied buildings of larger
cities. It has been noted that population growth has been most marked in
the latter group. Even if the average cost were taken at the figure of
Re. 3500, new investment for urban housing alone, i.e. apart from invest-
ment directly in productive facilities, would aggregate Re. 3150 crorw for
the 6 years from now until the end of the Second Five-Year Plan.
Employment might be sought more generally in the non-agricultural
field., There are currently some 45-50 million persons whose means of
livelihood fall in this sector, and 20-25 million of these are now in
rural areas. Twenty-one million new non-agricultural jobs mean an expansion
in employment opportunities over the six-year period by about 50 per cent
(sinceO this takes into account the 5 million non-agricultural workers who
are now unemployed). If it is assumed that 6 or 7 of the 21 million new
jobs a% provided in the urban areas (thus approximating the urban
concentratio** postulated in Table IIC), rural non-agricultural employment
1. Some figures by private industrial concerns on the average cost of
housing for their workers show a range of Re. 2700 to Ra. 5200 for the
minimum-cost units. These expenditures are frequently exceeded. (See, for
example, figures for the paper industry cited by Eddison, The Indian Paper
Industry, Center for International Studies, 1955).
would have to increase by more than 70 per cent. It might be observed
that a. large part (perhaps 35 per cent) of the present non-Agricultural
employment in rural areas is in cottage and handicraft enterprise. These
enterprises, as the Pinance iinister points out, are currently fighbting
a somewhat uncertain battle for existence." The immediate problem In
preventing more unemployment. On the housing front again, even if uban
population expanded more moderztely, as shown in Table IIC, housing invest-
ment in the urban areas would need to aggregate about Ra. 1000 crores
(3 million houses at Re. 3500). In addition, of course, rural housing
for the expanded population would be needed. In 1951, rural housing was
on the whole already overcrowded, although not to the extent of the urban
position. On the other hand, rural housing of minimum but adequate
standards can be built at a cost of about Re. 300 per unit, provided no
account is taken of direct labor inputs.
Given the present estimate of unemployment in agriculture, and
perhaps even larger figures, if account is taken of underemployment, it
is generally considered that tLe new employment opportunities ought to be
found outside of agriculture, as in the. assumptions above. However# the
Government of India thinz in terms of producing its food requirements,
rather than depending upon imports. Growth of population (by 30 million
people in the next six years) will therefore require expanded output-at
least by 1 1/2 per cent per year. While such an expansion need not require
a corresponding increase in the number of persons effectively employed in
agriculture, it seens reasonable to expect at least partial absorption
of the currently unemployed in agriculture over the period. The number of
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new non-agricultural job opportunities needed over the six years might thus
be reduced to closer to 3 million per year0 This is perhaps the most
conservative of the three alternative-and general--eployment possibilities
in a program to eliminate unemployment by 1966. A rough calculation can
be readily made of thie (minium) expansion needed in Ladian output. Assuming
that productivity per worker in non-agricultural fields remains unchanged,
non-agricultural output must be increased by 42.5 per cent over the next six
years. Agricultural output would need to increase by about 10 per cent.
Such increases, -n 1948/49 prices, imply 445 crores of income per year,
on the average, over the next six years. In these prices, this would mean
for 1960/61 a cdmestic product of Rs. 12,665 crores, of which Rs. 5360
crores (L2.5 1rer cent) would arise from agriculture, and fs. 7305 orores
from the rest of the economy0 Comparative figures are shown in the following
table0
TABLE III
Domestic Product,- 198/149 prices, as., crores
950/51) 1953/54? 1954/55 9 6 0/ 6 1 d
Agriculture 4340 (49%) 4730 (48.7%) 4870 (48.7%) 5360 (42.5%)
Othe? 4530 (51%) 4970 (513) 5130 (51.3%) 7305 (57.5%)
Total 8870 (100%) 9700 (100.0%) 10000 (100.0%) 12665 (100.0%)
a) Final Report of the Xational Income Committee, New Delhi, p. 143
b) See Mlalenbaum, "India's omestic Product," Indian
Economic Journal, Jano, 1955, p. 248. (FiLures have been conv eto a
factor cost basis, to make then comparable). In the text above, calcula-
tions are based on 1953/54 relationships, although the argument applies
to 1954/55, for which estimates k;ave not yet been made. Official estimates
for 1953/5a have recently becorme available. The new total is Rs. 9950
crores. S -tora1 coi'iponent r n -,ot available for this total. They woud
undoubted1, raise the present estinia tes for 1960/61.
-1a ". to increase,
02
In per capita terms, allowing for population as in Table IIC, the fuller.
employment objective would show a product of Rs. 308, as against Rs. 246
in 1950/51, a minimum increase of 25 per cent per capita over the decade.
In the above, particular attention has been focussed on the eMloyment
objective, and along the lines suggested by the government. Growing
unemployment (and indeed maintenance of the status quo) provides a aenstant
threat to the strengthening of democratic institutions as they were
visualized in the Indian Constitution. From an economic point of view
underutilization of available labor would appear to constitute at least a
temporary loss of resources that might be used for economic growth. On
the other hand, employment as an objective in itself may well be self-
defeating in the pursuit of accelerated income growth. Each unit of labor
tends to be morc productive as it is combined with increasing aowunts of
other resources. Given the relative scarcity of some of these other
resources (land, capital), it may well be that a larger increase in domestic
product can be achieved by the application of available capital, say, with
only a limited part of the unutilized labor. A maxirmam increase of output
in a given period may thus be inconsistent witi a maximum increase in
employment. (The gap between maximum output and output with more "labor
intensive" methods may be even larger, if the latter method in fact turns
out to be more capital intensive per unit of product than is the labor
saving alternative). IWle dangers of such inconsistencies can be exaggerated--
1. This calculation assumes the same product per employed man in non-
agricultural activity as in 1953/54, and a somewhat higher productivity in
agriculture. The over-all increase in output per man is of course due to
the higher output per man figures in non-agriculture, and the relative shift
in the labor force away from agriculture.
33.
at least in an econowy like India's .- they should be borne in mind in
discussing alternative possibilities for using :ndia 's additional labor
and other resources.
Before looking into the needs and possibilities of sectoral expansion
in output and employment, it may be of interest to examine generally again
the investment implications of a growth in output to Rs. 12,665 crores in
1960/61. If use is made of the 3:1 capital-output rctio of the Planning
Commission's First Five Year program, the Ra. 445 crores of additional
income each year would require new investment of Rs. 1335 crores, or
8000 crores for the next six years. 1955/56, the present year, is included
in the First Five-Year Plan period. If it is assumed that about 750 crores
of new investment (private, as well as public) naterialise during this
year, a Second Five Year Plan which hopes to make an appreciable dent in
current unemployment levels would appear to require a total investment of
Ro. 7250 crores, more than twice the level estimated for the first program.
On the average, this would mean net investment of about 13 per cent of
domestic product during the five years after 1955/56. (some of this invest-
ment might of course be financed from abroad, thus reducing the investment
burden on domestic product over the Second Five Year Plan years).
It is difficult, however, to state definitively that these employment-
output goals could in fact be accomplished with a net investment program
of Re. 8000 crores over the six years. The Planning Commission's capital-
1. See below, pages 29.31.
01)4
output ratio of 3:1 was not based upon experience in India. While it
was applied throughout a 25 year period in the Commission's model for
Indian growth, i.e., a period over which the pattern of Indian output was
expected to change significantly from its pre-Plan agricultural concentration,
the argument for the'low figure stressed the rural and agricultural
possibilities contributing to low ratios. 14ith the rather dramatic shIfts
out of agriculture suj.ested for 1960/61 (Table III)--and the importance
of housing construction in the program--one might appropriately question
whether the 3:1 capital-output ratio is not too optimistic. Certainly the
R. 3600 of capital stock per employed worker in non-agricultural activities
(the figure implicit in this assumption) would seem to be low even for
relatively light industrial activity. On the other hand, Mr. Deshmnkh has
suggested a 2.5 sl ratio for new investment in non-Ericultural activity
(and even here, apparently in other pursuits than those characterized as
"small enterprises"). however, the Finance "inister's over-all $nvestment
targets also include a sizeable allocation for agriculture. For the economy
as a whole, he inplies a capital-output ratio of 4.4:1.2 On this basis, the
1. On the other hand, such a ratio is reasonably consistent with a) the
facts that per capita product in real terms had not changed between 1931 and
1951 (see V.K.R.V. Rao in Capital Supplement, Dec., 1954 p. 15), and that
population has been increasingTy about 1.4 per cent per year in that period,
and b) the belief that savings and investment ratios have been about 5 per
cent of domestic product.
2. From Mr. C. D. Deshmukh's statement in the Indian x'arliament, Dec. 20,
1954, as reproduced in Indian Trade and Industry, Feb. 4, 1955, pp. 42-43.
It may also be noted taat the T.4:l figure, rather than his 2.5:1, or the
older 3:1, has been used by other planning authorities. Thus, the Finance
Minister of -est Bengal, in his budget speech of February, assumed that
Rs. 700 crores would need to be invested in that state to generate an income
flow of Rs. 160 crores. Actually (and for reasons not clear in the reports
available here), Dr. B. C. Roy doubles the investment esthiato thus derived.
It is not known whether the Rs. 1400 crores figure is due to the "big-industry"
nature of .1est Bengal,( or (as is more probable) to the fact that provision
must be made in Bengal for large imwigration from other provinces over the
period of the Second Plan. In any event, a Rs. 1400 crores investment seems
to correspond to an increased flou of incone of Rs. 160 crores.
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investment of Rs. 7250 crores suggested above would be increased to Rs. 10,600
crores for the Second Five-Year Plan period, 1956/57-1960/61. ((n assumptions
comparable .to thove of page 10 above, this investment would average almost
18.5 per cent of domestic product).
It should oe noted that the Rs. 7250 crores stand in some contrast
to the range cf Rso 5000-6000 crores suggested by the Finance Minister. There
is at least the possibility that the present figure, based as it is upon the
3:1 ratio, is too conservative. As has been indicated, the shift out of
, riculture and the rural areas means not only more industrial job opportunities,
but also some expansion in housing and overhead facilities (education,
transportation, in public health, etc.) in relatively concentrated population
areas. Here, capital-outut ratios might well be higher. On the other hand,
ratios below 3:1 are being applied in the provisional programs suggested
2
by various Indian organizations. The point here is merely that experience
provides no clear case for lower figures. If such ratios are pertinent for
the Indian economy over the next five or more years, their use should be
justified on the basis of a specific pattern of investient needs in which
relatively low requirements for inputs of capital can be demonstrated,
1. Given the higher capital-output ratios in his calculation, his
loier estimkutes are attributable to differences in employment targets. As
was suggested above, (footnote, page 4) the figures used here appear to be
consistent with employment objectives for the next decade.
2. See below, page 39 and Appendix.
3. As in pares 19-20, 29-43, below.
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C. Output Targets for 1960/61
The preceding estimates of income (and investment) were based upon
an employment objective. Despite the fact that output per worker in India
is today higher in non-agricultural activities (taken together) than in
agriculture, it still is low, relative to productivity levels in countries
with nore developed economies. The assumptions made might thus be considered
incompatible witn the objective of a program of economic growth. In any
event, an income target of Rs. 12,665 crores for 1960/61 certainly constitutes
a conservative goal. Furthermore, only general categories of employment
opportunities were considered-agriculture vs. non-agriculture, urban Vs.
rural. Neither employment possibilities nor the achievement of a necessary
and desirable bill of final products can be assessed without a direct approach
both to over-all expansion and to relative emphasis in different sectors,
The employment roals must clearly fit into a total development program.
The reconciliation of requirements for labor, for goods and services,
and for investment is obviously a major task now before the Indian Planning
Commission as it finalizes a draft of the next five-year plan. As of now,
there are only general official indications of the pattern and magnitude
of the Second Plan, with occasional mention of a specific goal in individual
sectors. Rccent statements, both by the Prime kiinister and the Finance
Minister, suggest that the final draft will plan for an increase in output
of about 5 per cent annually, and for new employment for 10 to 12 million
additional persons. These are consistent with estimates published in
April by Professor iahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute. In
1. Althougl the Indian Statistical Institute is priimarily engaged in
vovernmental research, its estimates are not official. (Only surimary figures
of the M ahalancais plan are avail :ble here as of mid-kay.)
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addition, there are estimates prepared by other private organisations-
notably by representatives of Indian business groups--which will inevitably
influence the final form of the next plan. Thus, the Economic Intelligence
Unit of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (IIPO) has outlined a program,
as has also the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FIcC). Insofar
as the latter two are based on the views of members of the private business
community, they probably reflect analysis from roughly the same output
objectives for 1960/61.1 (See Appendix)
There is available here only occasional information on the detailed
targets of output over the second five-year plan period* On the resource
side, there are some indications of the extent to which it is anticipated
that public savings can be expanded (whether through surpluses on current
account, borrowings and foreign grants, and over-all budget deficits).
Tile there are some rough approximations of the structural interdependence
of the Indian economy in recent years, there is little on the input
requirements for expansion of capacity in those sectors where this may be
necessary. On this last point there is for .ndia the important question of
whether certain forms of capacity expansion (some blacksmiths as against
a modern machine shop) may poridt a more efficient flow of production, over
a decade say, riven the abundant labor and limited capital that will be
available to the country in that period. For India too, the very fact that
current output leaves siEnificant labor and capacity unutilized (and the
fact that this unemployment has presumably been increasing over time) suggests
1. See Quarterly Economic Report, IIPO, Vol. I, No. 39 Oct., 1954o
PP. 17-22; Vol. I, ho. L, Jan., 1955, pp. 13-30. The FICC estimates are
from a preliminary manuscript of Dec., 1954. This has already been modified,
perhaps extensively, but the ncw version has riot yet been received here.
U'
the need to examine the possibilities for altering the input-output
coefficients already estimated for the economy. Under present conditions
it woAld thus appear the systematic use of input-output analysis or of
lirnear programming to obtain an approximation to the investment program may
'e either impossible or questionable. Pending further information on the
work now being done in India, it may nonetheless be worthwhile to examine
more carefully the pertinenit data and relationships which are available for
such light as they can throw upon the scope and pattern of the next Plan.
1. The 2utput Tsrget for 1960/61
Official statements, and nost of the unofficial plans, anticipate an
annual increase of domestic product of at least 5 per cent each year from
1955/56 through 1960/61. Specific rates are shown in Table IV, along with
comparative figures.
Table IV Annual Rates of Growth of Net Domestic Product
Pre-Plan First Plan Second Plan
1930/31 - 1950/51: l4% Actual 3% As given in 2.3%
First Plan:
1948/9 - 1950/51: ll% Plan 2% As in Table III 3.9%
above:
Official 5.0% ("about")
gtatements:
tahalanobis: 5.0
FICCs 7.6
IIPO: 7.
* i'or 6 years, beginning in 1955/56
1. For example, through significant shifts in techniques Involving
v;ry little c ital (rice production, road construction) and/or through
Ilterinfg the relative importaoce of different commodities in the final
bil V :oods (khamdi vs. mill~ade cloth, bicycles vs. cars).
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There is a clear contrast with pre-Plan performance of the Indian economy.
There is also a striking contrast with the imodel of growth anticipated
when the First Five Year Plan was formulated.
If actual performance over the past Plan years is combined with the
5 per cent figure being su:gested for the Second Plan, the growth model
implied would indicate a doubling of per capita net product by 1967/68
(rates of population growth remaining unchanged). Such a performance would
ccmpare most fvorably with rates of growth in the U.K., the U.S,, and
Japan in the first stages of their development progress. It may be comparable
ith achievement in the U.S.S.R. in the years from 1928, although the
Second War appt.rently delayed a doubling of per capita income until about
1950. Movement along such a curve would imply for the Third Five Year Plan
years an annual increase in net domestic product in excess of 6 per cent-
the levels currently prevailing in the Soviet Union.
The desirability of such rates of Crowth for India in the next five
years cannot be questioned, and a governmntal decision to attempt them
uould be heartening. Two groups of considerations are relevant here. First
is the question of the extent to mhich the pre-conditions for such rapid
rates of growtt already exist in India, or are about to appear. Second
are the possibilities for f-rowt. inherent in the present state of the Indian
economy, with its relatively large reserves of underutilized lauor and,
perhaps to a sm aller extent, of physical plant.
India's domestic product has exparided more rapidly than would have
been suggested by the rate of new investment over the past few years. 1
L There is, iowever, so.n question about the actual level of new
uinvestrent, .aRticularly in the r sector3  On this latter, see
im dirlas. speec to the 28th Aaiul ietirt of the FICC (March 5, 1955) and
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The Planning Coiinssion itself has attributed a major share of the income
expansion to faivorable weather conditions. Voluntary savings do not appear
to have pro grassed along the lines postulated by the Government of India in
the formulation of its (less ambitious) development outlook in 1951. Public
investment in recente years has been financed to a greater than antiopated
extent (oirer 50 per cent) by covernment deficits. Greater reliance is
expected to be placed on this rethod of financing in 1955/56, and perhaps
over the Second Plan period. The channeling of resources into investMant
by tLis process is desirable--at least so long as it does not compete with
private demands for the same resources for consumption or for private
ir vestment. There is no assurance, however, that competing demands may not
,rise; these miCht necessitate the introduction of new procedures to make
possible the required volume and pzttern of investment. Finally, so long
as the Indian investment program remains a combination of private and
public investment efforts, the climate of opinion in the private sector can
be expected to influence the future course of privi:te investment. The
"degree of mix" problem does not yet seem to have been resolved to the
mutual satisfaction of both sectorse 1
These observations suEcest both the importance of fortuitous events
in the level of income already attained and the ability of the Center to
convert a large share of these 1-ains into real capital formation. The
(continued from p. 16)
similar statements of the FICC, as well as of other business organizations.
On the view above, see Planning Commission, Progress Report for 1953-54 and
Malenbaum, "India's Economic Progress Under th 'lan", The Economic Wee y
Sept. 11, 19540
1. See discussions following the Prime i4nister's Avadi address to
the All-India Congress Committee, the reaction to the Tax Enquiry Commission
Report, the Fourth Amendment, etc.
public investment program has increased impressively to a rate almost
twice the pre-Plan level by early 1955a But it sees clear that governrental
organization and administration for development have not yet been stepped
up to the point where full advantage has been taken of the resources
available for Lnvestment, or even to where investment has reached the leveU
planned. Moreover, the problems of a more active private sector, both with
respect to cons-unption and investment, have not yet been fully mot, On
both the resources and the ,se side, pre-conditions for acceleteo growth
have still to be institutionalized.
Despite the progress already achieved, there has not been a reduction
in the level ol unemployment, Measurement is not possible, but a growth
in unemployment is generally believed to have taken place, In addition,
underutilisationa of industrial capacity apparently persists. A recent
study, 1 using (at& from 1946 through 1953, reports that throughout this
eight-year eaid, and particularly in recent years, existing industrial
capacity has been idle,
Detail.led figres of capacity are available for all four
years between 1950 and 1953., for 78 industries. Out of
t;is, 28 irdustries ere throughout working at less than
60 prcerit of capacity; 12 industries were working at
less than 60 percent of capacity for a period of three
years., Thus, in all 40 industries out of a total of 78
were working at less than 60 percent of capacity for a
period of three years or more. In other words, about 57
percent of the industries worked for a period of three
years or more at le than 60 percent of sapacityo
The expanding covernmental development program seems to have had relatively
little effect upon these, and perhaps other, "reserves" of resources that
l CN k "indian ndutry's Installed Capacity and Present
'roduction Leve'ls" Capital Decc 16, 195%, p. 19, The dA given do not
list the specifc i. u a ies nor their size, but information on these must
be obtainable, (I have written Prfo. Vakil for details)
might somehow be mobilized for investment. Conceivably, a development
effort might be organized which could, on the basis of fuller use of such
resources, bring about a dramatic increase in rural product, both
agricultural and other, and to a lesser extent in urban industrial output.
This would without doubt require an intensification of government participa-
tion in organizing change in rural areas, as well as larger direct
participation in making possible the use of specific industrial installations.
If successful, the results achieved should be considered as a discontinuous
upward movement of the level of output, rather than as one stage in a-longer-
period pattern of continuous growth along some smooth curve. After a five
(or ten) year period of revolutionary change in the organi"ation of output
in sectors where underutilization has tended to become chronic, annual rates
of growth might then proceed at a more normal and initially slower pace.
It is difficult to venture on how much of a contribution might be made to
output. On the surface, however, an average increise of product by 5 per
cent over each of the next five years would seem more attainable if such
an intensive (one-shot) effort were added to existing plans for orderly
expansion.
On this basis, it is assumed that a not domestic product of about
Rs. 13,250 crores (1948/49 prices) will be achieved by 1960/61, an expansion
of 32.5 per cent in six years. This fieure is in lieu of the RS. 12,665
crores suggested in Table III above, If, as seems probable, 1954/55 product
is somewhat higher than the Rs. 10,000 crores assumed in that Table, the
1960/61 target would be correspondingly raised. Per capita income would
reach Rs. 325, with an increase of some 3.5 per cent in each of the six
I
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years. Over the period of the second plan, domestic product would thus
expand by about Rs. 3000 crores, an average increase of almost Rs. 600
crores per year.
2. The Setoral Pattern of Output
With the large upward movemnt, there would also be important shifts
in the sectoral composition of product. In general, agriculture and allied
activities would increase less than other sectors; industry, mining, etc.,
would increase much more. The tertiary sectors might also contribute a
different share of the total output. The new sectoral pattern of output
in 1960/61 (and the relative amount of income generated in the different
sectors from now on) would need to be markedly different from those of the
past. Tables V and VI show broad categories of income, and of changes in
income, from 1931 and for same First Plan years.
It is clear that a shift to new patterns for the expansion in income
must counter long-time trends in the patterns of growth. Over some twenty
years, both agriculture and industry have tended to become less important
In the Indian economy, while the relative importance of services, transport
and trade has grown. In this last respect, Indian development over these
years seems to parallel economic growth patterns in the West. The sole
differenbe is that, instead of the tertiary sectors expanding with per
capita incoekt, in India they grew while income scarcely matched the rate
of population growth.
1. V.K.R.V. Rao adjusted his 1930/31 figures for British India, thus
making the 20-year comparison possible. He characterizes India as a "static
economy in progress." This experience warrants careful study. The population
movement to the cities was encouraged not only by a declining agriculture
(and cottage industry), but also because these sectors were increasingly less
efficient. Modern industry's rural markets were limited. Urban labor found
limited employment opportunities in the factories, Service sectors expanded
because of the facility of entry. The larger share they contributed to the
national product probably meant that, on the average, people could acquire a
less desired basket of goods for a rupee of the same value in 1951 as in 1931
0 S
Table V. Sectoral Composition of Income Growth
RB. crores - Past Periods
Increase in: 193132 -1950/51 1948/49 -1950/51 j 1950/51 1953/54
Agriculture, etc. 1090 47% 90 45% klO 48%
Mining, Industry 260 11% 0 0% 230 27%
Trade 580 25% 60 30% 110 33%
380 17% 50 25% 100 12%
Total Increase 2310 100% 200 100% 850 100%
Average annual 116 100 283
increase I
Source: 1931/32, V.KR.V. Rao, Changes in India's National Income
Capital, Deco 16, 1954.
1948/49- 175, National Income Comittee
1953/54, alenbaum, o cito
Table VI. Income by Sectors (Percentages)
1930/31 1948/49 1950/51 1951/52 1953/54
Agriculture, etc.
Industry, etc,,
Other
17o7
29o6
49.,o
17n0
3L.:0
16.0o
500
17o2
32,8
0)
17.6
3307
-"
4V i
9J-149 - 195152 - ,ut n,&1ome cnittee
9-5 54 - Malenbauri, 0. cit. I
1The evidence for 1951 throuLh 1j953 sos to a relative growth in
the contribution of industry to national income
. 
Un a percentage basis this
sector had almost regained the importance it had in 1930/31, although it
is reasonably certain that, within the total, large scale industry had
increased relative to small industries and handicrafts. Two factors are
obviouly associated with i c anged pattern Arst is the circumstance
of higher per capita inco, es (up about 4-5 per cent from 1950/51)--gitimulated
in large part by the favorable developments in agriculture in these years.
Second o-f course is the fact, that India had embarked upon a conscious effort
to expand national income. This last did contribute also to the improvements
in the agricultural sector, although miajor credit is apparently due to
favorable monsoons. While opinions differ on tl "shortfall" of investments
in the private industrial sector in the early plc. years, it is in no case
argued that such investment exceeded the levels of the pre-plan period. It
seems clear tht the incr ased percentage in Table V reflects nore the
greater utilization o existing industrial capacity than it does a relative
growth in new facilities for maniufacturing.
Inprovel temet in the agricultural sector bears miore or less directly
upon over 80 pe cent of India's pplation. That tiis should provide a
stimulus to the industrial sector, bota rural and urban, is not surprising
(although it would be good to analyze ti-s in terns of de.and elasticities
in rural arecs), that is surprising is tuo absence in tiese sumaary data
of any obvious effects of the industrialization process in India since
1930/31. The information readily available is not adequate for careful
study of the shorter-period develop ents since 1930/31. Expansion and
diversificatin in large scale in 4stry wie takinpg place; people eAr
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moving from the rural areas* Productivity in large-scale industry, as
in non-agricultural activities generally, appears to be higher than in
agriculture. In themselves, these, one rdght expect, would have provided
the stimulus for over-all income growth relative to population, and for a
greater importance of net industrial output in total product 0 Apparently,
they did not,
Increases in industrial income in the last few years again point up
the underutiliza.tion of capacity in Tnian industry. The persistence of
underemployed resources does suggest some answers to what the data of
Tables V and VI reveal. It does not explain the growth in industrial
capacity over the past decades or the fact that this expansion was not
fully used to meet the needs of a poor country.
Presumably, the next Plan will show significantly different sectoral
1
patterns from those in the preceding tables. In the past, expansion of
industrial capacity was not accompWied by a growth in the relative importance
of this non-agricultural sector0  Trade and services have grown disproportion-
ately. In the future, the relative importance of tertiary activities, as well
as of agriculture, must decline as the broad category of mining, industry,
etc., expands. Given the historical evidence, it is reasonable to assume
that the new patterns will not just happen. The need for direct action to
this end must complement the direct action needed if total product is to
2
expand by about 5 per cent each year.
1. This is clearly suggested in the plans outlined briefly in the
Appendix.
2. See page 19. As was suggested above, there is room for careful
analysis of the factors which brought about the pattern of development in India
over the past decades0 Such study might provide helpful guides to the kinds
of action needed on the part of entrepreneurs and consumers, of the government
and private sectors, if the changed patterns are most readily to be brought about.
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A possible pattern for 1960/61 is shown in Table VII, along with
the changes from 1954/55.l The specific patterns assumed are consistent
with the general considerations above. Wherever possible, use was made
of the proposals in plans which have become available in India over the
past months (See Appendix, and discussion of some specific sectors below).
Table VIII corresponds with the past materials of Tables V and VI, and with
that of other plans as shown in the Appendix.
The over-all domestic product target in Table VII is of course the
estimate discussed in preceding pages. It assumes essentially the 5 per
cert annual rate of increase suggested by Nehru and Deshmukh. It is also
considered a fuller-employment target* In other words, the dtifference
between Ro. 13,250 crcres and the earlier estimate of the minimum increase
compatible with certain employment objectives is taken to be a gain through
higher productivity per worker. The sectoral breakdown of Table VII w&
constructed in part on the assumption that employment opportunities would
somehow be found for 21 million persons over the six year period. It has
been argued above that a larger amount of direct participation by government
was probably ,A pre-condition for assuming a 5 per cent annual increase in
domestic pre.duct. In particular, "small enterprises" and to some extent
"constructiA.on", served as residual categories in the construction of Table VII.
They provide the residual income (for a total increase of Rs. 3250 crores)
and the residual employment (for a total of 21 million new job opportunities).
1. For that year, the total product was taken at Rs. 10,000 crores,
wish sectoral breakdowns as given in the CENIS study for 1953754. This
corresponds with the treatment in Table III above. (The official estimates,
by sectors, now available for 1953/5 hive not yet been received here)0
2. See PP., 7 - 9 above,
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TA BLE VII
jomes tic Product by Sectors, 1954/55-1960/61
Ra., crores, 1948/49 prices
"LE'ICUure,
~e
Indus tlr, e
Factorv
Trade and
Services
5evtc
Domesti
House
otia I
~co
tt ~
ome rco
nd Ins .,
,ther Tranp.
20 ~
1760
770
80
1540
460
L.20
100C
Increase 6 Years
T Amount
t200
(90)
('7 )
(2305)T
(16. 5)
(30)
(50)
(neg,
(3 ,)
(320i)
L30
260
470
230
10
150 j
19602,/
5670
3310
12L0
(U30)
(L 50)
2260
1830
2010
690
570
1,3250
c
rope
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Table VIII. Domestic Product, 1960/61; Sectoral Composition
of Increase 1956/57 - 1960/61
(Rs. crores, 1948/49 prices)
B. Sectoral Composition
A. Domestic Product of Increase - Second
Five-Year Plan
Re. Crores Percent Rs. crores Percent
griculture 5670 1.2.8 740 25
Mining, Industry 3310 25.0 1130 48
(and Construction)
Trade 2260 17.1 400 13
Services 2010 15.1 430 14
otal 13,250 10000 3000 100.0
(Av. 600)
The figures of the tables inevitably suggest a precision which they
cannot have, even as projections. The argument is based upon the limited
information available hereo Wreover, given the incomplete nature of
these, no attempt has been made to go below the categories listed in
Table VII. The composition of agricultural output, of industry, etc.,
and the interrelations among their parts may condition
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the output of the sectors as a whoile, Atet, th & su
are preliminary orders of magnitude, ic pph aar to be ccasistent uith
general demand (including investment) possibilities, and ,ith employrnt
requirements.
Agicultures Income growth in ag.ricultur4'e was taken at twice the rate
of population increase, If the entire increase were in food alone, this
would provide for about a 10 per cent expansion in per capita food
consumption (as against a 23 per cent increase in per capita poc
Actually 8" per cent of Indiags agricu tural output consists of fro
items; this ratio will probably decline wiih increased idustrial derand
for the products of agriculturl', This wOd Loan & aLl.,r percentage
increase in per capita food con7 per cen,,', o or oar cont.
Admittedly, this is a low increase, given the nuitioa caLse that cai b
made for an expanded and improved dieta.ry, On th*rl other unu, there is
some basis for associatint an increase of 7 to 10 ur cent in food
consumption with a 2C-25 per cent increase in domesti. productQ1
Indian plans seem to envisage a larger expansion, i agricvltural
product by 1960/61--with increases ranging from 20 to 25 er cent above
current levels (See Appendix)., Presu.ably, therefore, I en be erpeated
that the lo increases unt LIas o-
as expansion in capacity for agricultural output doevs va i the
1 On the basis of the figures in this paper, dora. i product wouldi
increase by Rs, 60 per capita over the six year period, (!uswpt xp.
ture by about Rso 45. If 40 per cent of this incrase to g o food,
food consumption would increase by 9 per cent per capita (Statisi _S
demand relationships in India are currently being stidi by the idr
Statistical lastituteon the basis of the sample survey :aterial:
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investment of goods and services in relatively short supply in India, there
would appear to be a case for a heavier concentration in the non-agricultural
area0 I
Trade and Services: The relative growth of these sectors in past
years has already been noted. As is seen in Table VIII, these two sectors
show relatively small contributions to the expansion in income over the
six year period. In 1960/61, their share of domestic product is below the
1950/51 level. However, important components in them (and aostly those
which did not participate in the past general growth of the trade and
service sectors) are shown with reltively large expansions, Notable here
is transport and communications (65 per cent increase),home property
(35 per cent) and government services (50 per cent), The first of these
was assumed to increase at twice the rate of domestic product as a whole.
This is consistent with the expansion suggested by the FICC and the IIPO
(but smaller absolutely, given their larger expectations for increases in
total output)o House property income is expanded more or less uith total
product; it reflects also the increase in urbanization.
'1-th respect to government services, earlier discussion has made clear
the emphasis placed upon a greater role for the public sector It is
assumed that corunity activities will have to be stepped up, both with
respect to coveraCe and d1epth. If the anticipated levels of output from
construction an( small scale enterprises are to be achieved, additional
public employees in Indian iilla ges w:ould seem to be essentiale The
specific increa3e selected is an arbitrary one', and is meant to give
l See below, ppo 34460
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dramatic content to the importance attached to the government's role in
a major development push over the years until 1960/61. (The increase has
been calculated from a figure of additional employment. 1 ) Finally, other
components -f the trade and services sectors have been increased little,
usually by half the rate of growth of total domestic product.
Industry: For the organized components of this sector, the 75 per
cent expansion in income over six years may be compared with a 67 per cent
increase for five years in the Mahalanobis proposal; it is sigiificantly
smaller than the absolute (and relative) expansion for these activities
contemplated by the FICC and the IIPO. Given the need for larger outputs
of investment goods and for increases in per capita consumption of
consumer goods produced by factory establishments, a large expansion is
obviously in order. In the published plans enough detail is given on
possibilities of expansion and rise of output to justify increases of this
order of magnituite,
Estimated increases in the other sectors-amall enterprise and construction-
are residuals, although a rough approximation to the construction component
is attempted below. It is really assumed that, through a large organisational
effort, output from small enterprises can be extended significantly. Moreover,
such expansion offers the only possibilities, in India's present economic
situation, for increasing total product to the desired levels. Expansion
here ill be relatively labor-intensive: it is essential both to provide
employment opportunities and to begin to create a broader and deeper market
in India for the products of industry. Growth in small enterprises will be
in the uran areas, largely to complement large industries through the
production of compone.nts, perhaps 'trough sub-contracts. Growth will be
lC, See beloJ page 35,3
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even more marked in rural areas, especially where non-monetary transactions
are still important. Here they will produce consumer and simple producer
goods for local consumption. The argument is that where there are unfilled
needs--for shoes, clothing, housing, furniture, pots and pans, etc., or for
wagons and carts, simple agricultural tools, village roads, more schools,
and the like; and where there are tocal undera-utilised resources--men,
work space, locl raw materials--there, incentives, organization and an
essential increment of capital goods and raw materials can expand output
that will be absorbed. Initially, at any rate, government must supply the
necessary leadership and such hard goods as are required.
It is true that some such rural activities are now carried on in the
community development programs, and others are contemplated under expanded
small industry programs, The former effort, while impressive, still needs
to be stepped up markedly. Its shift in emphasis to agriculture needs now to
be balanced by equivalent priority to other aspects of rural life-.and by
the rapid increase of personnel assigned to these tasks. Unlike much of the
new small-scale industry effort, there is here less intention to develop
urban or foreign markets for the new production in rural areas. Essentially,
all of it is for local use. indeed, it is assumed here that the large-scale
organized sector will meet any demand which it can fill. In principle, there
should be no attempt to limit activity of the large, lower-cost sector,
either with respect to its present markets or those which it can develop.
The Coal here is to reach needs not now being met by the organized sector,
needs that will not be met, given the limited real incomes and the low
growth potential in many rural areas under present conditions. As output
from these small establishments expands, it can be expected that demands
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which it begins to meet will gradually shift to the product of the
organized sector. Again, an attempt should not be made arbitrarily to
interfere with the "more industrialized" forms of output for which there
is effective demand now and as over-all development progresses. Ideally,
the expanded output from the small sector should be considered transitional
to a period when the organized sector is better able to fill India's need
for industrial product. In the Third Plan, for example, there might thus be
scope for a much greater relative increase in output and employment opportun.
ities in modern industries (and a tertiary sector which will need to grow).
Table VII ventures an admittedly arbitrary breakdown between "small
enterprises" and "construction". Apparently this latter category - reflect-
ing at le&-st some components of new factories, public buildings, service
establishments, railway track extensions, dams, houses, etc., -- is contained
under a number of heads in Indian national accounts. Here, the bulk of
them has been assigned to the broad industry sector; the items to cover
labor and entrepreneurial returns in construction are assumed to have been
included under the National Income Committee's "small enterprises" (and
are here separated out); the lumber, cement, steel, glass, machinery, etc.,
are assumed to be covered under income from factory establishments. More-
over, there are no official estimates of investment (neither net nor gross).
Estimated output of the construction sector -- whether for maintenance,for
new factories and houses, etc., -- is not available from official sources.
1. Some support for the present treatment is provided in the Mahalanobis
Plan document (or insofar as it is available here, i.e., in the April 22, 1955
issue of the Eastevn'3conomist). Here, for the first time to my knowledge,
"small enterpriis"appear as "household enterprises and construction."(cont ed. next page)
Unof ficial estimates of capital formation in pro-plan years (as woel
as *illustriitive" data presented by the Planning Commission) are available
in some detail. 1  In pre-Plan years, these sources suggest that the construction
component o7 net capital formation may have aggregated some Rs. 200 crores.
(footnote -'om p. 31 cont.)
A single f.yure is available for both, and at a level which suggests that
it is in fait the old "small enterprise" category.
The treatment of "construction" in Indian accounts is not readily
followed. 1hus, the 1951 Census reported about 1.6 million workers under
"constructioi and utilities." These constitute 5 per cent of all the non-
agricultural (and self-supporting) workers. In the National Income
Committee "working force" table, which is broken down to correspond with
the "industriail origin" table used in National Income Committee income
estimates, these workers are allocated among different sectors. Thus, about
757,000 of the.-e construction workers have been returned by the Census under
"construction and maintenance-buildings." The iiational Income Committee,
after estimating that some 10 per cent ^f these construction workers may be
indirectly in t e employ of government (via contract arrangements, etc.),
allocates this .rcentage to "public administration" and returns the rest
in the industry secter. Presumably, then, private housing and factory
construction are included under the industry category(?). Almost 149,000
construction workers are returned under the Census category of "construction
and maineenancee-road, bridges and other transport works." The National Income
Committee allocates 1 '3 of these to railways, 1/3 to public administration
and 1/3 to industry. There is no specific reference to "construction and
maintenance-..irrigatit a and other agricultural works" (114,000 workers).
Presumably, they have been allocated to agriculture, which would be undera
standable if the bulk of their work was maintenance, as distinct from not
additions to the irri ation system, etc. Similarly for other construction
worker categories wh:i are specifically reported by the Census.
A tentative infc nce is that the product of the construction sector,
so important as a con i nent of capital formation, is allocated among the
sectora to the expandi capacity of unich the construction sector contributes
For new factory and heising construction, however, the sector is apparently
"industry." This tent itive inference, drawn from the working force alloca.
tions of the National Lncome Committee, is not at all confirmed in the
National Income Committee's derivation of not product in the industry sector,
for example. (It is rlear that more guidance is needed on the appropriate
allocations.)
lo See ?ukherjeo and Ghosh, Bulletin of the International Statistical
Institute, Vol. 33, ?art III, pp. 49-68; also #irst Five Year Plan ppo 107-1080
Ve- 'T-M-~the Indian .nput-Output table prepar t ditute of
Pulbic Opinion (Quavierly Economic Report, Vol. I, No0 3, ppo 26-27).
36
(This figure would be increased by about Ra. 160 crores if account is taken
of rural construction which was non-monetized, and presumably undertaken by
farmers, small industry owners, etc., in their spare time, and without any
significant outlay for materials.) The first figure itself is about 45 per
cent of total net monetized investment in those years. (All construction
would be more than 60 per cent of the larger investment figures, i.e.
including the non-monetized component.) There is little doubt that this
construction figure increased during the First Plan period. While data are
not available on this point, it seems clear that private investment (other
than that in organized industry) went up in the early Plan years. Construction
is a large part of this non-organized investment. The Plan itself called
for increases in public construction activity, in agriculture, industrial
enterprises, railways, etc.; it is not known here how much did in fact
occur, nor the direction of changes from the pre-Plan level of activity.
In its input-output table for 1952/53, the Indian Institute of Public
Opinion indicates a domestic product from construction of Re. 251 crores;
it suggests in addition some Rs, 250 crores for "rural non-money investment."
These estimates are certainly in the right direction.
In Table VII, the construction estimate of Re. 200 crores for 1954/55
is to be taken as exclusive of hard goods used in the buling of caeital structures.
By 1960/61, this item is assumed to increase to Rs. 450 crores, with a total
contribution to net product over the six years of Rs. 2000-2400 crores.
This estimate encompasses not only housing (annual construction of about
800,000 new urban dwelling units for an urban population increasing to
levels suggested in Table IIC, and some 700,000 new units in rural areas),
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but also factory buildings, hospitals, other public construction, etc.
D. Employment, 1955/56-1960/61
Two important aspects of a program along the above lines require some
consideration. Will the volume of investment be available, and in the form
required (foreign exchange, for example), to permit creation of the
additional capacity needed for the final product of Table VII? First,
however, what are the possible employment implications of such a program?
In Tables IX and X are presented what are considered to be some
plausible possibilities on the employment side. The starting point for
the calculations, the 1954/55 estimates shown in Table X, are no more than
careful guesses. Totals are consistent with the figures of Table IIB
and the unemployment picture described in page 4 andl 5 Allocation of
working force by sectors follows the general pattern given by the National
Income Committee for 1950/51, with adjustments made in the light of the
growth of product during the early Plan years and of occasional employmerit
figures (for factory establishments, for example), A rough indication
that these guesses were not wholly out of line is given by the correspondence
between average net output per man employed in 1954/55 (column 2 of Table I.)
and the official computation for 1950/51.2
1. The Ra. 2000-2400 crore range, augmented by the cement, steel,
lumber, etc. used in construction (and output of which is included in the
factory establishment sector) probably imply total new construction of
Re. 32C0-4000 crores over the six year period.
2. National Income Committee Final Report, p. 108. Adjistment must be
made for (1) the fact that present istiiiiteseclude the unemployed, while
the National Income Committeees refer to the entire working fcrce, and (2) the
1948/49 prices of Table II, as against the current levels for National Income
Comittee. mhen adjusted, the 1954/55 figures reflect the upwrd move.ment
due to economic improvement since 1950/51.
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Table IX
IncreImental Labor Productivity, 1954/55-1960/61
(All values inf198/49 prices)
Add1l. Labor
~millions)
(1)I
Agriculture
Industry, etco
Mining
Fact. Esto
Small Ent.
Cons tr .
Trade and Commerce
Rys. and Commo
Bank's and Ina s
Commerce,
other Trarpo
Services
Prof.
Cov t.
Domes tic
House Property
Total
1000
o5
45
5o6
2.5
205
100
105
209
o7
20
o2
21eO
Net output/an Eloyed
(Rs )_
Average Incremental
1954/55 6 Years
(2) 1 (3)
1200
1140
2625
835
1000
1740
1730
1740
870
1100
560
7.35
1425
1550
1200
3750
1270
1000
1740
1730
1740
1100*
1150
n50
560
Addlo 0 u 1960/6
(Ra. crores)
(4)
t.00
60
530
710
250
430
170
260
470
80
230
10
150
3250
- ~ I,
property," wnere employment negligible0rFxeludes income from "house
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Table X
ALdtitional Employment, by Sectors, 1960/61
(million persons)
Agrico etco
Industry etco
Minin
Fact. Est.
Small Ento
Constr,
Trade, Commerce
Ryso and Comme
Banks, Ins.
Commerce and
Other Transo
Services
!ofo
Ooveto
Domestic
9804 10901 (90)
lho~6
2,7
9o2
20 o
1Co $
1 5
12,7
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Twenty-one million persons--12 million new members of the labor force
and 9 million of the currently unemployed--are then allocated among the
sectors of the economy, as shown in the first column of Table IX. Consistent
with the preceding discusyion of income expansion and of the historical
development of the tertiary sectors, only about 25 per cent of the new labor
force is assumed to find employment in the trade and service categories.
(Moreover,, incrnmental productivity in these sectors does not show significant
increases.) Also, almost half of the new workers are in mining, industry,
etc., with 80 per cent of these in the unorganized sectors0
If the entire increment of product, Rs. 3250 crores, is taken to be
associated with the newly employed, their incremental product works out to
Ra. 1550 for the economy as a whole-somewhat more than double average
productivity in 1954/55.2 However convenient such an association, it is
more true with respect to factory establishments, for example, than to
small enterprises and agriculture. The development pro grami would more
nearly tend to broaden the first sector. The increase of almost 50 per cent
in the output per man in modern industry could be assumed on the basis of
the new and more modern factories that will be established. For the other
two sectors, capital and organization would serve importantly in raising
productivity of all the persons engaged, as well as of the newly employed.
1. This treatment differs grettly from that of the FICC and IIPO
formulations, where, as the Appendix shows, labor is allocated generously to
the tertiary sectors. (MaterI available here on the ISI formulation does
not include allocation of additional labor.)
2: A comparable computation for the first three plan years gives an
incremental product of Rs, 2040 per worker. (See Appendix). Here, however,
there was the mjor t-in from the favorable weather. Moreover, estimates
of actual additional employment in these years are essentially assumptions.
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For agriculture, for example, an incremental product of about 3 times the
average simply reflects the progress to be made on all the farms in the
country0 Similarly, to some extent, for small scale industries.
General considerations such as these, technological information on
the labor components of expanded product--and oasonable guesses--permitted
some approximation to a sectoral figure either for new employment or for
incremental productivity. ith the breakdowns for incremental output
already available from Table VII, columns (1) and (3) could be completee..
The final employment estimates for 1960/61 of course reflect the
reduction in unemployed by 9 million persons. As might have been anticipated,
there is actually a small reduction in the agricultural working force
(despite an increase in employment, and the large natural growth). Ihile
the rural-urban components of Table I are not shoun, this movement from
agriculture is to a much smaller extent a movement from the rural areas,
Opportunities there are created in small-scale industry, in the many phases
of construction, in trade, and in government and other services. By
1960/61, the rural-urban employment breakdown would approximate the ratifs
of Table IIC.
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E. Investment, 1955/56 - 1960/61
At the usual ratio of 3:1., the expansion of product to the level of
Re. 13,250 crores would involve a net investment of Ro. 9750 crores over
the six year period. The draft plans currently being discussed in India
generally use much lower capital-output ratios: 1*03 for the IIPO; 1.7 for
the FICC (preliminary draft); and apparently 2.24 for the Mahalanobis
program. However--again, from what may be the limited documentation
available here-the case for such low ratios does not seem to be argued
fully in the proposals. 1 In any event, a low ratio for the Second Plan
with its heavier concentration on industry scarcely seems defensible on
the ground "that the return on industry is considerably higher than that on
agriculture, and this return is available in a much shorter time." 2
Simultaneously, the Mahalanobis program provides for a five-year increase
of income in "agricultural and allied pursuits" of Rs. 1060 crores, with
an investment in "agriculture and irrigation" of Re. 1150 crores. This
implies a sectoral ratio for agriculture of 1.08:1, for investment which
includes the expansion in irrigation works.
There would appear to be little body of agreed thought and experience
on the difficult problem of "how much investment for how much income." The
more one looks, the more impressed one is with the case for higher rather
than lower ratios. Increased steel capacity and output feature large in
lo See above, pages 10-12.
2. IIPO Quarterly Economic Report, Vol. I, No* 3, p. 19. The IIPO
gives a 1.2:1 figure, but actually seems to have reversed the ratio in its
computations.
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the industrial expansion of all the programs. On the roughest basis, an
additional million tons per year adds some Ra. 30 crores to product and
requires about Rs. 150 in new investment. Even mores, India's growing
product over the next years must include a relatively large volume of
output in the form of structures--the houses, factories, shops, dams, etc.,
mentioned earlier (in the discussion of the needed expansion in construction )
The total of this output must be matched by investment. This line of
reasoning leads to high investment requirements relative to the new income
flow0e
On the other hand, the type of program visualized here does attempt
to exploit underutilized resources. Insofar as these exist in the modern
industrial sector, this would serve to moderate the (high) requirements for
new capital that would otherwise prevail. For the less organised sectors,
and especially the non-monetized parts of these, such a program should serve
both to increase product with relatively little monetized investment and
perhaps also augment the application of non-monetized investment; i.e. more
labor inputs can be obtained "free" for onmbination with cement provided for
new construction, and more clay and lumber might be available for investment
which would not otherwise have been used0 These considerations work toward
lowering the capital-output ratio, They also suggest that the ratio computed
with only monetized investment may be significantly lower than one in thich
monetary and non-monetary investment is combined. However artificial from
a technological point of view the former ratio is, it may be the relevant
one for an economy which keeps account only of monetary investment 0
1. See above, pages 31-34o
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Table XI - Net Investment, 1954/55 - 1960/61
(monetized and non-monetizod)
Rs. crores
Total Monetary Non-Monetary
1) (2) -(3)
Construction 3500 2000 1500
Agriculture 800 500 300
Mining 2 250
Factory Est. 1600 i600
Small Ent. 1400 700 700
Transportation 850 750 100
Other 300 300
Total 8700 6100 2600
The figures of Table II represent some first (and crude) efforts at
approximating the investment requirements for the output program discussed
earlier. The construction item is not co-terminous with "construction* as
shown in Table VII, since it includes hard goods as well as expenditures
on labor and management 0 Factories and houses are in this total, as are
new roads, new dams and power stations, etc. And expenditures for these
structures are excluded from the investment shown for agriculture, trans-w
portation, manufacturing, etc. (The sectoral figures are thus not comparable
at all with those presented in the various draft plans.) For agriculture
itself, the capital-output ratio assumed is 1:1; for mining, 4:1; for
factory establishments-even after allowing for increased use of existing
capacity -- 3:1; for small enterprises, 2:1; and for transportation and
communication, 5:1. Again, these figures are not directly comparable
with other capital-output ratio computations, since these do not reflect
the large investment in construction activities, which bears upon all of
them.
For the econoy as a whole, the capital-output ratio works out to
2.7:1. Using monetized investment only, the computation is 1.9:1. Over
a six year period, some Rs. 8700 crores would be needed. Of this total,
Rs. 6100 crores would need to be mobilized in monetary form. If the above
approximations are at all within plausible ranges, such money investment
can achieve the income and employment targets, provided it is combined
with an intensive program to put underutilized resources to work. This
latter phase of the program -- involving an additional investment effort
40 percent as great as that of the monetary program, and providing major
employment and income possibilities -- may be essential, not only to the
targets for 1960/61, but to create conditions for subsequent growth in
the Indian economy.
While the monetary component of this investment program (about
Rs. 1000 crores per year) is comfortably below the investment requirements
suggested by governmental officials and by other groups in India, little
guidance is available on the specific program which these groups have for
mobilizing investment resources. Thus material here does not provide
savings-investment flow estimates for India during the period until 1960/61.
(Firm Indian statistics are not available on such flows - planned or
actual -- for the First Plan period.) One finds occasional insights into
the problems of raising sufficient funds for development in the public sector
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during the next five years; and there is considerable discussion of the
lack of realism in assuming a marginal savings rate of 30 per cent or so,
and of the inflationary dangers in a five-year program involving invest-
ment (at least monetary investment) aggregatin6 Rs. 5500-6000 crores. But
the information is not comprehensive. Accordingly, the discussion here
will sketch very roughly some lines along which a six-year investment pro-
gram of Rs. 8700 crores -- of which almost one-third, Rs. 2600 crores
are non-monetary -- might be financed. In such a discussion use will be
found for most of the guides on financing available in specific Indian
proposals.
The 1955/56 domestic product is taken at Rs. 10,300 crores, and the
1
consumption ratio at 93 per cent. If income grows at 5 per cent annually,
and consumption takes 60 per cent of this expansion, the domestic output
2
available for investment would be about Rs. 7700 crores. Add foreign
loans, other foreign aid, reduction of sterling reserves, etc., aggregating
1. The Union Minister of Planning indicated a current savings rate
of 7 per cent (speech by G. L. Nanda, Nay 25, 1955).
2. Savings ratios would increase to 14 per cent of total product
in 1960/61. This contrasts with Nanda' s suggested expansion to 1 per
cent (for a program in which capital-output ratios have been assumed to
be significantly lower), and with the Planning Commission expectation
in 1951/52 that by 1955/56 50 per cent of additional income might be
invested.
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Re. 1000 crores, and these domestic savings would be sufficient for the
six-year investment program.
In the absence of savings information by income or occupational
groupings, there is little firm basis for indicating the source from which
Roo 7700 crores (an average of about Re. 1285 crores annually) might
arise and their probable destination. In the pre-Plan-I years monetary
savings and investment averaged Rs 450 crores, and non-monetary about
Rs. 150 crores more. These can be separated very roughly into categories
more or less in accordance with the institution which mobilizes the savings
2
and channels their investment. First is government savings: surpluses on
current account and net profits from current operations of such public
enterprises as railroads. In the pre-Plan-I periods, these provided some
Rs. 125 crores annually, 28 per cent of monetary, and about 20 per cent of
all savings. About Rs. 150 crores of private savings (one third of al
monetary savings) were mobilized by corporate industry, insurance companies,
the stock market, small savings schemes, cooperatives, etc. These public
and private categories essentially exhausted what might be called "mobile
savings", non-consumed surpluses which either vent to public institutions
or which were (or might have been) handled through financial intermediaries -
1. This figure has been suggested in discussion of the plans.
It compares with an expectation of about Re. 800 crores during the first
plan. (Sterling reserves are not appreciably different from what they were
then; the rate of foreign aid has been somewhat expanded; possibilities for
international lending (and investment) are probably more favorable; in the
U. S. Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954 offers some prospects
for appreciable foreign assistance.)
2. See text above, pp. 31-33, including footnote references.
Also, Cenis, No. C 54-1 (May 17, 1954), pp. 6-10. This categorization
has few advantages beyond being available.
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banks, insurance companies, etc. These Ro. 150 crores represented more
nearly the savings of larger economic units and wealthier people, but they
undoubtedly included a part of the savings of other groups, both urban and
1
rural.
Finally, Rs. 175 crores of monetary savings (40 per cent of the total)
were invested directly in small-scale enterprise, and probably did not move
at all through financial institutions. These represented the direct
investment, mostly of the small entrepreneur (-Who might of course also be
investing some of his savings through the institutions above). Since non-
monetary investment is clearly non-mobile, it is assumed that all Re. 150
crores of it fell into this category; non-mobile savings thus represented
55 per cent of all the pre-Plan-I savings.
In the years 1955/56-1960/61, the average savings will need to be more
than twice the level of the earlier period (R. 1285 crores, as compared
with Rs. 600 crores).. Public savings will increase to Re. 200 crores. It
can be expected that private mobile savings will increase more than
proportionately -- from Rs. 150 crores to almost Rs. 525 crores in illustrative
computations. In part this is due to the growth in the role of financial
intermediaries in the economy, This still leaves about Rs. 560 crores for
2
the non-mobile category, as against Rs. 325 crores in the pre-Plan-I period.
This includes Rs. 435 crores of non-monetary investment (the Re. 2600 crores
over six years), up steeply from the earlier level of Rs. 150 crores, The
1. A large component of mobile savings was assembled through small
savings schemes, which are important in rural areas and among lower income
groups.
2. Despite the conscious stepping up of non-monetary investment in
this program, non-mobile savings are a smaller part of the total of Re. 1285
crores than they were in 1948/49-1950/51.
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remaining non-mobile investment is Rs. 135 crores, reduced from the
previous figure of Rs. 175 crores as a result of the larger flows to
government, through financing institutions, etc.
How plausible is such an increase in savings, i.e., the 40 per cent
marginal rate allocated roughly in these categories? On direct public
savings (and on domestic borrowing from private mobile savings of about
Rs. 185 crores each year through public loans, the small savings schemes,
etc.) such magnitudes are consistent with "official" expectations, and
1
generally below those of other Indian groups. They imply a stepped up
tax program and a major effort to induce more lending or saving through
government channels, as well as the more favorable prospects for them
arising from growth of per capita incomes. On expanded savings in the
private sector, it must be pointed out that a major expansion is to occur
in the non-monetary form, Insofar as this uses resources that would
otherwise be unused, or labor that society would maintain in any case, the
total increase in output might be saved and invested. In any case, marginal
savings rates from such expansion in product will tend to be high. For
the rest, there will be large increases in income in expanding industry --
a circumstance which should encourage heavy plowing back of profits; there
will also be very large expansion in such sectors as small industry, where
consumption propensities appear to be low,
Channeling these savings into the investment patterns indicated in the
proposal will be helped both by the large amount of resources moving
1. Figures of at least Rs. 1000 crores for five years as public
savings, and again as such public borrowings from private sources, have
been given by Mr. Deshmukh, as reported in Indiagr No. 697 (may 12, 1955);
the FICC in its preliminary document, pp. 51-54;and the IIPO in its
Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 28-30.
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through government channels, and the major participation of the public
sector in the entire development effort. Thus, public savings and public
borrowing of actual private domestic savings will themselves yield
Rs. 2200-2400 crores in six years on the basis of the figures given above.
In addition, government could count upon Rs. 1200 crores more (mostly
from private mobile "savings") by maintaining an appropriate over-all
1
budget deficit over the period. This would mean an average level of
deficit financing below what prevails today. This reduction is to be
expected -- and desired, since it is hoped that consumption inelasticities
which facilitate the current high level of such borrowings will gradually
be removed. Finally, foreign resources for investment of Rs. 1000 crores
would either accrue to government account or could be used only with the
cooperation of the public authorities. Together, these aggregate Rs. 45002
crores available for development expenditure over six years.
Since the public (monetary) investment in the proposal was to total
between Rs, 3300-3400 crores, there would be sufficient funds (Rs. 1100-1200
crores) for loans to the private sector, joint undertakings, etc., -- opera-
tions for which India has already established a number of institutions. These
resources would go to supplement the mobile savings still in the private
1. On deficit financing, the Finance Minister has used a Ra. 1000
crores total, over the five year period. (The figure here is for six years).
He is reported to have remarked (May 22, 1955) that such levels were "safe
in present circumstances" according to economists whose advice the government
was inclined to accept (Indiaram No. 705).
2. Public savings and domestic loans and savings Rs. 2300 cr.
Domestic borrowing via over-all budget deficits 1200
Foreign capital inflow 1000
Rs. 4500 cr.
sector, particularly in modern industry. They could be of particular
value in government programs to encourage construction, agriculture and
small-scale industry where private resources are primarily available through
the direct investment of small entrepreneurs. They would assure that amount
of "monetized" goods and services needed to bring out a maxinn effort in
non-monetary investment, both on public and private account.
In the illustrative computations underlying these figures, the private
savings left could be allocated to investment on a scale and in a pattern
which parallels (what is known about) the uses made of such resources in the
past by these sectors. The new areas would largely be on the non-monetary
side. Here the leadership role of public authorities is, again, the key
element.
Of course, this exercise in arithmetic proves nothing beyond the
proposition that the savings goal (Rs. 7700 crores domestically, monetary
and non-monetary) and the pattern of investment, public and private, along
lines of the text proposal can all be made to add up. However, it has
also been argued that the component elements on the savings and investment
side are plausible -- where they are not what experience suggests might
happen anyway. Moreover, many of the "plausible" propositions are based
upon estimates and observations of officials and other Indian groups
intimately concerned with development over the next years. After all, these
people were confronted with the problem of raising Rs. 1000 crores or
so annually, and in monetary form only. This is not a very different task
from what would be a major concern in implementing a development effort
along the lines suggested in the present paper. One may conclude, therefore,
1. Indeed, some argument might be presented to the effect that only
through the much greater effort called for here (especially in the non-
monetized sector) could there be assured that pattern of output under which
monetary savings and investment of Rs. 1000 crores a year would be possible
without inflationary consequences.
that finances should not be considered an a priori deterrent to a
development effort of the scale proposed.
F. Conclusion
The preent proposal has been formulated only in broad outline.
The program is directed at the achievement not only of the stated out-
put objectives of the Government of India, but also of employment targets
which are believed to be more in keeping with the requirements of the
present position in India. Yloreover, it focuses on a rural development
effort which might succeed in expanding appreciably the resources put to
investment purposes, without impairing consumption levels. Indeed, the
argument has been made that some such focus is necessary if India is to
create the conditions of greater internal economic interdependence which
is essential for subsequent development of her economy.
In the course of the presentation, frequent reference has been made
to the various Indian formulations of a Second Five Year Plan -- at least
insofar as pertinent information is available here. Key aspects of these
programs are presented in comparative form in the Appendix below. While
each of these Indian drafts does pay attention to the need for mobilizing
underutilized resources, the key role of the unorganized sector, the
possibilities for non-monetized investment, etc., there appears (in the
abbreviated versions available here) no over-afl assessment of the magni-
tude of the task nor of the nature of the key responsibility of the public
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sector in its fulfillment. Study of these plans suggests that the
various proposals are unrealistic in their employment objectives, in
their assumption as to the gains from new investment, and in their
assessment of the kind of program required if the conditions for rapid
and long-period growth of the Indian economy are to be established.
1. In the discussion of the present program, there was no need to
define precisely the specific activities which fell in the public or
the private sector. Again roughly, almost 50 per cent of the total
investment of Rs. 8700 crores would be in the public sector, as"oiild
55 per cent of the monetized investment of Rs. 6100 crores. Private
non-monetized investment in construction, agriculture, and small
enterprises would be large.
Whatever the specific separation between the two sectors, the
important matter is the leadership role of the public authorities. The
more decisive this, the greater the prospects of success in the total
effort, i.e, in both.sectors.
